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Fostering a sound and progressive financial sector 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore 
1. Introduction 
The Government and the Monetary Authority of Singapore set up a Financial Sector Review Group 
(FSRG) in 1997. MAS’ regulatory approach, centred on high admission and prudential standards as 
well as rigorous enforcement, had produced a strong and well capitalised banking system. But rapid 
technological advances and consolidation sweeping the global financial industry presented new 
challenges and risks. This necessitated a fundamental rethink of its approach to supervising and 
developing the financial sector.  
To help the FSRG in its work, a few private sector committees were commissioned to study specific 
issues like banking competitiveness, banking disclosure, corporate finance and the stock exchange, 
and consultants engaged to undertake financial sector and IT strategy studies.  The review resulted in 
a new approach to supervising and developing the financial sector. There were three main thrusts. 
Liberalising the financial sector 
First, MAS liberalised the financial sector to promote competition and enterprise. Greater participation 
by strong foreign financial institutions would speed up the transfer of new technology, management 
expertise and financial innovation to Singapore. The stockbroking industry was deregulated and 
protective barriers in banking and insurance were lowered. 
These financial reforms were undertaken through a steady series of incremental changes rather than 
in a “big bang”.  MAS was mindful of the need to manage these reforms in an orderly manner so as to 
allow time for its regulators, financial institutions and investors to develop new expectations of one 
another, and understand the new way things worked.  
Reviewing the regulatory and supervisory framework  
Second, MAS shifted its emphasis from “one-size-fits-all” regulation to risk-based supervision, so that 
it could focus more attention on issues of systemic risk, and calibrate supervisory intensity to the risk 
profiles of financial institutions. While maintaining the high standards of sound financial management 
that have become associated with Singapore, it recognised the need for a more conducive regulatory 
environment, including providing financial institutions the leeway to respond to the increasingly 
sophisticated needs of their clients. 
MAS strengthened disclosure and market discipline, to enable investors to better judge and take risks 
for themselves. It pushed for higher standards of corporate governance in the financial sector, to 
cultivate a stronger self-regulating corporate culture, better risk management and internal controls, and 
greater transparency. It also moved to greater transparency and clarity in its regulations and built a 
closer partnership with the industry. 
Taking a more strategic and proactive approach to development 
Third, MAS adopted a more strategic and proactive approach to developing the financial sector. 
Besides being the central bank and supervising the financial sector, MAS is also responsible for 
development of the sector. The breadth of its coverage gives it a good vantage point from which to 
gather industry views on promising growth areas and help bring value-adding activities and key global 
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The Asian crisis that was engulfing the region confirmed the importance of MAS’ long-standing 
fundamentals but also highlighted lessons and potential risks.  Due to the strong foundation laid 
earlier, Singapore’s financial system was relatively unscathed.  This gave MAS the flexibility to press 
on with reforms and even liberalise at a time when the environment was more risky. 
This paper highlights the key changes and initiatives in MAS’s policies and organisation for 
supervising and developing the financial sector following the review in 1997. Section 2 provides details 
on the phased liberalisation of the banking industry. Section 3 describes MAS’ risk-focused, 
stakeholder-reliant, disclosed-based and business-friendly supervisory approach. Section 4 sets out 
the deposit insurance scheme that it is putting in place to provide an appropriate level of systemic 
protection. The paper concludes with the organisation changes MAS has introduced to strengthen its 
capabilities in carrying out its core functions. 
2. Banking  liberalisation 
Starting in 1999, MAS allowed foreign banks meeting its eligibility criteria greater access to the 
domestic retail market. MAS gave enhanced access privileges only to banks that met its prudential 
criteria and that were able to contribute to the financial sector by introducing new services and 
expertise to the market. 
MAS phased in the liberalisation to give time to its local banks to respond to the increased 
competition. Four foreign banks were first given enhanced market access privileges in 1999, followed 
by another two in 2001. The access privileges (such as number of service locations, access to 
Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sales systems, and Automated Teller Machine networks) 
granted to these six banks were also progressively improved over five years. 
MAS also eased entry to the wholesale banking market.  This significantly broadened participation by 
foreign banks in the domestic wholesale market and encouraged international banks of good standing 
to use Singapore as their Asian base. It gave sophisticated customers in Singapore better access to 
world-class financial products and services.  
Besides giving foreign banks leeway to grow organically in Singapore, MAS also allowed strategic 
cooperation between Singapore and foreign banks. The 40% aggregate foreign shareholding limit for 
local banks was lifted. In its place, MAS implemented nationality requirements for the board of 
directors and tightened the single shareholding approval thresholds at 5%, 12% and 20%. MAS also 
signalled willingness to consider proposals by foreign banks to acquire strategic stakes in the local 
banks if they could add value and strengthen the local banks as a result. 
3.  A principle-based supervisory approach 
The phased liberalisation was complemented with a review of MAS’s regulatory and supervisory 
framework. To clarify and guide this ongoing process, MAS issued a monograph in 2004 entitled 
“Objectives and Principles of Financial Supervision”, which spells out MAS’s objectives of supervision, 
the functions it performs and the principles that guide its supervisory approach.
1 
Moving away from “one-size-fits-all” regulation, the approach strives to be risk focused, stakeholder-
reliant, disclosure-based and business-friendly. 
                                                       




MAS has been systematically reviewing its regulations to address well-defined risks that can have 
systemic implications and to sieve out those which are no longer relevant or necessary. Institutions 
launching new products need not come to MAS for approval, as long as the institution as a whole 
keeps within MAS’s prudential supervisory framework. Limits on car loans and aggregate investments 
in equity have also been lifted as it was assessed that banks could manage these risks. MAS also 
recently reviewed its requirements on securitisation transactions and replaced the need for prior 
approval with a notification requirement, to enable banks to bring securitisation transactions to the 
market more quickly. 
To provide institutions with incentives to better manage their risks, MAS has put in place risk-based 
capital frameworks. It has also revised its minimum liquidity requirements for banks, making them 
forward-looking and taking into account supervisory reviews of banks’ liquidity policies and practices.
2 
Banks that passed MAS’s bank-specific liquidity assessment may peg their requirement to the volatility 
of their cash flows. 
Supervision 
Starting in 1998, MAS adopted a top-down, risk focused approach to bank examination, moving away 
from the traditional, bottom-up method. Emphasis is placed on the process by which a bank’s 
management itself addresses its risks, instead of reviewing the books for control deficiencies.
3 
MAS also put in place structured frameworks to evaluate the risk profiles of its institutions and assess 
the potential impact they would have on Singapore’s financial system, economy and reputation. To 
strengthen the integrated supervision of institutions, it harmonised industry-specific risk assessment 
frameworks into a single framework that applies to all classes of institutions that it supervises. This 
activity-based framework emphasises the evaluation of risks and the quality of governance, controls 
and risk management processes commensurate with the scale and complexity of an institution’s 
operations.
4 
To better understand the risks of a more inter-connected system, MAS has put more resources into 
macro-prudential surveillance. Analysis of macroeconomic and financial developments and their 
implications for the stability of the financial system has been enhanced and there are regular meetings 
to bring together macro- and micro-prudential perspectives on risks and other stability issues. Since 
December 2004, MAS has also published a Financial Stability Review (FSR) on a semi-annual basis 
to communicate its views and findings on the risks and vulnerabilities facing Singapore’s financial 
system. 
Stakeholder-reliant 
MAS has introduced initiatives to encourage and reinforce self-governance in financial institutions. 
Regulations and Guidelines on Corporate Governance 
As part of the banking liberalisation measures, MAS had required local banks to appoint Nominating 
Committees within their boards to ensure that only competent individuals who can contribute to the 
bank and discharge their responsibilities in the interests of all shareholders are appointed to the board 
and key management positions in the bank. This has been further strengthened by the issuance in 
September 2005 of a set of Corporate Governance Regulations (“Regulations”) and Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance (“Guidelines”) that are consistent with global best practices. 
                                                       
2  Prior to the review, banks compute and maintain a minimum amount of liquid assets based on their historical liability base 
as defined by MAS. 
3   MAS’s FY1997/98 Annual Report has details on this on pages 67-68. 
4  MAS’s FY2004/05 Annual Report has details on this on pages 26-27. 340  BIS Papers No 28
 
The Regulations contain requirements that MAS considers essential for sound corporate governance, 
in particular the presence of an independent element on each bank’s board. The Regulations specify 
the proportion of directors on the board and board committees who must be independent of the 
financial institution’s management, business relationships and substantial shareholders. The 
Regulations also include rules that require banks to separate their management from those of the 
affiliates of their substantial shareholders, and for the separation of the Chairman and CEO roles 
within a bank or an insurance company. MAS also strongly encourages its banks and direct insurers to 
adopt the best practices in the Guidelines, given the diverse and complex risks undertaken by these 
institutions and their responsibilities to depositors and policyholders.  
Separation of financial and non-financial activities 
In June 2000, MAS required banks in Singapore to focus on their core financial business, so as to 
minimise the risk of non-arm’s length transactions between banks and their non-bank affiliates, and to 
limit the risk of contagion. Under the policy, the local banking groups are required, over a period of six 
years, to separate their financial and non-financial activities, divest control of all non-financial activities, 
and unwind all cross-shareholdings within these groups. In addition, local banks are allowed to 
undertake equity portfolio and venture capital investments, and to hold properties solely for their own 
use or for investment purposes. 
Strengthening the quality of external audits 
The local banks have publicly disclosed all non-audit consulting fees paid to their external auditors 
since 1999. They are also subject to the listing requirement of the Singapore Exchange that audit 
partners be rotated every five years. 
In 2002, MAS required banks incorporated in Singapore to change their audit firms every five years. In 
doing so, MAS had recognised that frequent rotation of auditors could be resource-consuming and 
could result in audit gaps. After consultation with banks, it was decided that a five-year rotation period 
would balance the need to enhance audit independence and bring fresh perspectives to the audit 
process with the desire to provide for continuity and contain costs. 
Disclosure-based 
Steps have been taken to put in place a regulatory framework that provides timely, accurate and 
meaningful disclosure of material information that consumers could reasonably rely on to evaluate the 
product, judge its risks, and make financial decisions. 
Benchmarking disclosure norms to international standards 
Banks in Singapore raised their disclosure standards significantly following a 1998 review by a private 
sector committee. The local banks began disclosing the market value of their investments, the level of 
their non-performing loans, past and future provisions, off-balance sheet items, and significant 
exposures. They have continued to improve disclosure in line with industry developments and 
international best practice. Local banks now publish their annual accounts within five months of the 
financial year-end. As with other listed companies, local banks started quarterly reporting of interim 
financial announcements with effect from January 2003. They also disclose pertinent information 
relating to the areas of corporate governance practices, financial performance review, risk exposure, 
risk management practices and risk taking philosophy in their annual reports, in line with international 
standards. 
In the supervision of capital markets activities, MAS is also placing increased emphasis on market 
discipline through a disclosure-based regime. For example, disclosure standards for prospectuses 
have been tightened and the continuous disclosure of material information is mandated for listed 
companies. MAS has also made issuers and their advisers more accountable for making relevant 
disclosure, and subject inadequate or misleading disclosures and material omissions to statutory 
penalties. Investors now have access to civil remedy against offenders, while criminal sanctions 
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Empowering consumers to assess and assume financial risks 
As more financial products are introduced, consumers need to understand these products well to 
make informed decisions. To enhance the basic financial literacy of consumers, Singapore launched a 
national financial education programme called MoneySENSE in October 2003. The MoneySENSE 
programme adopts a three-tiered approach that focuses on basic money management at the lowest 
tier, then looks at financial planning at the next tier, before moving on to the last tier on investment 
know-how. 
Establishing efficient and affordable dispute resolution mechanisms 
MAS also facilitated the establishment of a Financial Industry Disputes Resolution Centre (FIDReC) in 
August 2005 to enhance the efficiency of dispute resolution mechanisms for retail consumers. FIDReC 
brings together existing dispute resolution schemes under the banking and insurance sectors, with 
extended coverage to include the capital markets sector. Mediation services, the main way of 
resolving disputes, are provided free by FIDReC. If mediation fails, the dispute then enters into 
adjudication for a fee of just S$50. 
Business-friendly 
Formalising consultation 
MAS introduced guidelines in 2002 to formalise public consultation as a standard procedure whenever 
significant changes in its regulatory framework are planned. Besides raising levels of transparency, 
consultation has helped MAS tap industry expertise and experience on new products and business 
models, better understand the impact of new regulations on competitiveness and compliance costs, 
and identify the operational and implementation issues that industry may face. 
4. Safety  net 
MAS is introducing a deposit insurance (DI) Scheme in April 2006.  The main objectives are to provide 
a basic level of protection for small depositors, and to reduce the moral hazard from any mistaken 
perception of an implicit government guarantee on deposits.
5 
As its local banks expand overseas and foreign banks increase their presence in Singapore, the 
banking system and depositors will be exposed to more risks from these banks’ international 
operations.  International experience has shown that the possibility of a bank failure and loss to 
depositors cannot be eliminated even in reputable and well supervised jurisdictions. Moreover, as 
most foreign banks in Singapore operate as branches, MAS’s supervision is confined to their 
operations in Singapore, even though the risks to their viability may arise from any part of their global 
operations.  Cross-border insolvency proceedings will also present significant uncertainty and delay 
claims in Singapore against a bank’s overseas assets. 
Greater certainty of and clarity in depositor compensation will enhance public confidence in banks, and 
the financial system’s stability.  In the event of a bank’s failure, the DI Scheme will compensate 
individual depositors and charities up to S$ 20,000 per depositor
6 per institution through a fund built up 
from contributions by Scheme members. The Singapore Deposit Insurance Corporation Limited 
(SDIC) was established in January 2006 to administer the DI Scheme and manage the deposit 
insurance fund.  To strengthen recovery by the SDIC from the failed institution of any compensation 
paid out, Scheme members that operate as foreign bank branches are required to maintain sufficient 
eligible assets located in Singapore to meet its insured deposit liabilities. 
                                                       
5  Depositors’ expectation of a government bail-out would reduce their incentive to seek out sound banks and weaken market 
discipline on banks, potentially undermining banking system stability. 
6   This amount is on a per depositor per institution basis which would apply in the case of failure of more than one bank. 342  BIS Papers No 28
 
5.  Strengthening the organisation 
MAS is fairly unique in that it is the central bank, integrated financial supervisor and financial sector 
developer. Since 1998, MAS has undertaken a series of internal organisational changes to bring 
together departments with existing and potential synergies and to facilitate a more integrated 
approach to meet its core mission and objectives. 
MAS has grouped its banking and insurance supervision departments to focus on prudential, and its 
securities departments to focus on market conduct regulation and supervision, for a more holistic view 
in supervising financial institutions and markets. Next, the prudential and market conduct policy 
functions across the three industries have been clustered together in order to better harmonise 
regulations and policies across financial activities. A Complex Institutions Supervision Department was 
set up to take a more integrated approach to supervising financial groups, evaluating them on a 
whole-group basis. This allows MAS to develop and retain both the depth and breadth of skills and 
expertise necessary for assessment of individual industries and complex financial conglomerates. 
MAS has given more focus to financial surveillance and financial stability. A Macroeconomic 
Surveillance Department (MSD) within the monetary policy arm of MAS was established to better 
identify and monitor emerging trends and potential vulnerabilities in the financial system and markets. 
As mentioned earlier, MAS has institutionalised a regular meeting to discuss financial stability issues, 
bring together macro-and microprudential perspectives, as well as market insights from the reserve 
management and financial development functions. 
MAS has also strengthened working arrangements between the developmental and supervisory 
functions. However, these separate and dedicated departments within MAS for financial supervision 
and financial centre development report to different senior management staff. In addition, officers 
involved in supervision are not charged with initiating and implementing developmental initiatives. Any 
potential tensions or trade-offs between supervision and development are resolved at the senior 
management level, which has collective responsibility for MAS’s dual mandate for supervision and 
development. 
In light of organisational restructurings and changes in the structure of financial markets and its 
regulatory approach, MAS has fine-tuned and specified more clearly in legislation its objectives and 
responsibilities relating to monetary policy and financial supervisory policy. In addition, it has used 
mechanisms such as key performance indicators, periodic External Perception Surveys,
7 and peer 
assessment through the IMF and World Bank’s Financial Sector Assessment Programme to measure 
the performance of each group carrying out the functions under its different roles. 
This ongoing process of organisational review will strengthen MAS’s ability to more effectively carry 
out its core functions in a challenging external environment. 
                                                       
7  The External Perception Survey (EPS) seeks to obtain feedback from external stakeholders on MAS’s performance as a 
central bank, integrated financial supervisor and financial centre developer, as well as on its general attributes such as 
competence and responsiveness.  MAS publishes a summary of the main EPS findings on its website. BIS Papers No 28  343
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Some Banking Sector Financial Indicators 




















(% of Total Commercial Bank Loans) 
Bank Loans  64.8  65.8  67.1  66.2 65.6 66.0 65.4 65.1 65.4 
Non-Bank Loans  35.2  34.2  32.9 33.8 34.4 34.0 34.6 34.9 34.6 
Loans through the Asian Dollar Market and Domestic Banking Units 
(% of Total Commercial Bank Loans) 
Total ADM Loans  72.3  72.8  71.9  72.3 72.7 72.6 71.5 71.7 73.1 
Total DBU Loans  27.7  27.2  28.1 27.7 27.3 27.4 28.5 28.3 26.9 
Sectoral Distribution of DBU Loans 
Manufacturing 4.7  4.6  4.1  4.1 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 
Building & Construction  10.6  10.4 9.5 9.6 9.6 9.4 8.9 8.8 8.9 
Housing  21.8 22.7 21.6 22.5 23.9 23.4 23.4 23.2 23.7 
Professionals & Private 
Individuals 
 





Non-Bank Financial Institutions  9.6 9.4 8.8 8.5 8.7 8.8 8.4 7.9 8.0 
Banks  26.2 25.5 30.8 29.3 26.9 28.8 30.9 31.4 30.1 
Domestic Liquidity Indicators 
Liquid Assets to Total Assets  14.1 14.3 14.0 13.1 13.6 13.0 12.8 13.1 13.0 
Loan/Deposit 90.4  88.3 85.9 85.7 88.2 86.9 84.3 83.4 82.1 
Local Banks’ Indicators 
Capital Adequacy (Per Cent) 
Regulatory Capital to Risk-
Weighted Assets 
 





Regulatory Tier I Capital to Risk-
Weighted Assets 
 





Shareholders’ Funds to Total 
Assets 
 





Asset Quality (Per Cent) 
NPLs to Non-Bank Loans  7.0  6.7 6.2 5.5 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.2 4.0 
Total Provisions to NPLs  64.4  64.9 67.8 71.5 72.8 76.6 77.7 78.9 80.0 
Specific Provisions to NPLs  37.0 36.2 37.1 37.6 40.0 41.3 41.9 41.9 41.2 
*  Data relates to all commercial banks, Singapore operations only. 
Sources: MAS, local banks. 
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Number of Financial Institutions in Singapore 
Type of Institution  Number of Institutions as at 24 Nov 2005 
Commercial Banks  110 
 Local  5 
 Foreign  105 
  Foreign Full Banks  24 
 Wholesale  Banks  34 
 Offshore  Banks  47 
Merchant Banks  49 
Representative Offices of Banks  42 
Finance Companies  3 
Insurance Companies  150 
 Direct  Insurers  59 
 Professional  Reinsurers  27 
 Captive  Insurers  59 
 Authorised  Reinsurers  5 
Insurance Brokers  62 
Money Brokers  9 
Holders of Financial Adviser’s License  58 
Holders of Capital Markets Services License
1  173 
  Dealing in Securities  70 
  Trading in Futures Contracts  39 
  Leveraged Foreign Exchange Trading  13 
  Advising on Corporate Finance  34 
 Fund  Management  91 
 Securities  Financing  16 
  Providing Custodial Services for Securities  30 
1  The licensing regime under the Securities and Futures Act allows holders of a Capital Market Services license to engage in 
seven regulated activities. 
 